Reforming Dahlanistan

Some emotive words get so misused in U.S. political discourse that after a while they begin to lose their meaning. Words like “freedom”, “democracy”, “patriotism”, “terror” (and many more) have become so loaded that you have to know who is speaking, in what context, and with what agenda before you can be sure that you are understanding the word as your speaker intends. The same phenomenon is apparent in discourse about the Palestinians, with the most mangled word in the Palestinian political lexicon undoubtedly being “reform”. Our news media happily report on the need for “reform” of the Palestinian Authority, as if this term has a single meaning and as if the average U.S. viewer has any idea at all what that meaning might be. The reality is, however, that “reform” in a Palestinian context has a number of extremely specific, and self-interested meanings, which vary depending on who it is that is calling for “reform” at any given time:

1. When the Israeli government says that the PA must “reform” before Israel can talk peace, the exact area to be reformed is often nebulous, but the bottom line is always the same: the Likud does not believe in an independent Palestine, and will always be able to find one more area in need of reform/one more hoop that the Palestinians must jump through before talks can begin.

2. When the U.S. says the Palestinians must “reform”, it means that they must unify their various security services under a U.S. approved strongman, i.e. not President Arafat. This “reformed” security service must be trained by the CIA to control internal (i.e. Islamist) dissent and provide security for Israel, and must work in close coordination with the security services of Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, similarly trained by the CIA to stamp out dissent in their respective countries.

3. When the European Union demands that the PA “reform”, it means that it must introduce transparency and accountability into its financial affairs. (The EU is the major source of PA funding, and the Europeans have a not unreasonable interest in being sure that their money is going where they intend).

4. When Palestinians call for "reform", they want democratic elections that will establish the institutions that will be the basis of an independent Palestinian state. They are not going to get elections, however, as long as the U.S. and Israel fear that Arafat will win another term in office:

The real reason why the Israeli authorities, with the support of the United States, will not permit Palestinian elections is that they do not want Arafat to be reelected….So the PA can go on making all the preparations and its senior officials can talk as much as they wish about democratic processes and procedures, but as long as it’s clear that Arafat will win, elections are not likely to take place.

-- Danny Rubinstein, The Other Elections; Ha’aretz, 16 Nov 2002.

(This point refers back to my opening sentences, about words like "democracy" not necessarily meaning what we think they mean when they are used in American political discourse).

So, what are we to make of the current unrest in the Gaza Strip where, according to our mass media, Fatah “reformers” are challenging the “corruption” of Arafat-appointed cronies. Which category of “reform” do the Gaza reformers belong to?

Well, inconveniently, the “reformist” gunmen who last week attacked the most visible symbols of Arafat’s rule in the Gaza Strip (Generals Ghazi Jabali and Musa Arafat), and torched PA police stations there in an apparent protest against “corruption”, don’t necessarily fit into any of the above categories. Although western media tend to present the unrest as protest by “reformers” against corrupt Arafat cronies, Palestinian analysts and informed Israeli commentators emphasize that this is not a struggle between innocent reformists and corrupt conservatives. It is rather a face-off between strong men in positions of power, in which the issues of reform and corruption are simply being used to lend legitimacy to those who wish to challenge Arafat's entrenched leadership.

Among Palestinians, the current “intrafada” in Gaza is generally believed to be the handiwork of supporters of Mohammed Dahlan, former head of the PA’s Preventative Security Service in Gaza, and still the local strongman there. As Amira Hass has pointed out, it’s a little ironic that Dahlan should be riding the wave of popular discontent at Arafat’s cronyism, patronage and disregard for the rule of law, when his own rise to prominence has been fuelled by, well cronyism, patronage and – during his tenure as head of the PSS – disregard for the rule of law. (Dahlan’s record on human rights and respect for the law was so poor that local Gazans referred to the Strip as “Dahlanistan” when he was in power there).

When the armed followers of Mohammed Dahlan call for “reform” they too have their own specific meaning for the term (which I suppose would be number 5 on the list of definitions above). Reform for Dahlan means:

1. In line with American demands, unifying the PA’s various security services under a U.S. approved strongman; that strongman being (surprise, surprise) Mohammed Dahlan. This “reformed” security service to be trained by, and coordinate closely with, the CIA (with whom, coincidentally, Dahlan has maintained a close relationship ever since the creation of the PSS in 1994. In fact, Dahlan’s relationship with his U.S. security counterparts is so close that he is nicknamed “Condoleezza” in the Palestinian Territories, though I suspect not to his face).

2. Holding elections: not on a national level, but within Fatah, in order to displace the older generation of Fatah officials who returned from exile with Arafat and remain entrenched at the highest level of Fatah institutions. (Coincidentally, Dahlan is believed to enjoy the support of at least 70% of Fatah’s younger members in the Gaza Strip, and would expect to be the prime beneficiary of elections to the Fatah Central Committee and Revolutionary Council).

And why is Dahlan’s challenge to Arafat coming to a head now? Well, Dahlan has been out of government since the fall of Abu Mazen last September, but the prospect of Israeli disengagement from the Gaza Strip has brought him back into the spotlight. Arafat might not trust Dahlan, and may suspect the younger man is seeking to sideline (if not replace him), but as Dahlan remains probably the most powerful single security figure in the Gaza Strip, Arafat cannot ignore him. As one Fatah official put it, at a time when the Gaza Strip is the focus of Israeli-Palestinian relations, Dahlan’s continuing shows of strength there are a forceful reminder to President Arafat: "Either I play, too, or there will be no game."

All of which is a very long-winded introduction to the fact that the long-awaited biography of Mohammed Dahlan is now online. Access it here, or through the Palestinian Biographies link on the sidebar (left).

Update, 27 July 2004: Also updated the existing biographies of Haidar Abdel Shafi, Sari Nusseibeh, Jibril Rajoub, Abdul Aziz Rantisi and Saeb Erekat.