John Haas
America Abroad Media
Transcript: Interview with Saeb Erekat; Jan 2007.
[Begin Saeb Erekat Interview]
00:00:00
Interviewer:
--the problems and their border instabilities in the Middle East--there
is currently a debate on this point in the United States.
00:00:08
Response:
Well I think it’s evident by now to say that the crux of the problem in
the region is the Palestinian question. I think the 20th Century was
marked with the mentality of denial; there were those who denied the
existence of even the Palestinian people. There were those who tried to
solve the Palestinian problem as a refugee problem than--rather than a
national problem. There is also denial of Palestinian national rights
and its Statehood and for 100 years. People went through wars,
conflict, violence, counter-violence, instability in this region, coup
d’états, and everything was done in the name of Palestine somehow
somewhere--either to solve the problem or to liberate Palestine or to
get a solution to Palestine today.
I don’t think anyone disputes the fact that this region needs two things to be put in the path of peace and stability--and moderation. Number one is a Palestinian State next to the State of Israel--it’s doable; we don’t need to reinvent the wheel. We know that at the end of the day there will be a Palestinian State next to Israel on the [‘67] Border. The second element that’s needed in this region is democracy. And anyone who says Arabs are not really for democracy is a racist. And I believe it’s high time for the United States policy makers to shift their thinking from a policy of what’s possible--meaning coming to Israel, finding out what the respective Prime Minister of Israel can do and cannot do and then share their policies in accordance with [those possible]. What’s needed to--what we need today is a policy of what’s needed and what’s needed is to transfer President Bush’s vision from a vision to a realistic political track.
00:02:17
I: Why do you think that the Clinton Administration and President Clinton himself became so heavily engaged in the Israeli Palestinian peace process during the ‘90s? Was this a good idea?
00:02:28
R: It was a good idea. It was absolutely a good idea. And I think President Clinton left his mark and I think he turned every possible stone possible. I would not call what President Clinton did as a failure--maybe Camp David did not produce agreements, but this is a process. This is not a normal situation; this is not the Ecuador Peruvian Border; this is not the US Canadian Border; this is not immigration issues between Mexico and the United States. This is an issue of history and religion, gods, security, psychology--this is an issue that involves the whole world. This is an issue about Christianity, about Judaism, about Islam, and I believe President Clinton brought Palestinians and Israelis to where no person had brought them there before.
Now the fact that we did not produce an agreement in Camp David doesn’t mean that these efforts that were exerted by President Clinton failed. On the contrary--this was a due course; we needed to go this way. We haven’t wasted a minute in the last decade or so of negotiations. This is not your normal situation; this is not your normal conflict; this is not conflict resolution in its classical sense of how to get an agreement done. This is beyond and Palestinians and Israelis have come a long way--at least today, 70-plus percent of the Palestinians support the two-State solution when it was--10 years ago it wasn’t--was even unthinkable to [inaudible] recognize Israel for a Palestinian and for Israelis 15 years ago they didn’t even recognize the PLO or the fact that we existed as people. We have come a long way; I think President Clinton did a very good job. He brought Palestinians and Israelis to these squares, turned so many stones, and I believe this--we don’t need to [eat the apple] from the start. We can begin where we left off and at the end of the day we know the parameters of what makes an agreement and in my opinion issue is like borders, settlements, refugees, water, security, Jerusalem, refugees are all doable; they’re do--doable. And I think what we need now is a focused effort in order to reach the end-game void of any interim agreements or any [inaudible] borders or--or this issue that will add to the complexities--that doesn’t solve the problems.
00:04:58
I: What did Rabin and Arafat agree to the Oslo Accords in 1993?
00:05:02
R: [Sighs] Well I don’t think they had any other option. Rabin and Arafat were pioneering in--in an area where they did not even see one centimeter in front of them. Rabin and Arafat were really the initiators of the peace of the brave because this was something absolutely unprecedented in the thinking of Palestinians and Israelis. If you had come to Palestinians in 1990 and asked them about Israelis the only thing that would come to mind is soldiers standing in a roadblock or demolishing a home or shooting at civilians. And to the Israelis if you say the word Palestinians somebody [carrying a knife trying to stab] Israelis; and to have Rabin and Arafat agree on Oslo whereby they envisioned okay these are the issues of Jerusalem, settlement, borders, refugees; these are the issues that make Palestinians and Israelis breathe; let’s put them aside for a little bit later, but let’s see now what can--kind of relation we can build. Can we build the trust level, the confidence, can we change the mentality of all people because leaders may sign an agreement but that with Palestinians and Israelis doesn’t make peace. Peace is made the day after; how will this affect the social, economic, education, agriculture, life of both Palestinians and Israelis? And you have two constituencies with eyes that will only see things that have not been done. They are incapable of seeing the [done] things. Palestinians and Israelis only focus on things that were not done and maybe that’s articulate, maybe that’s [inaudible], maybe that’s because they have so much [inaudible] to them but I think President Arafat and Mr. Rabin, they both deserved what they got as the Nobel Prize Winners along with Mr. Peres.
00:07:05
I: What mistakes did the Israelis make during the Oslo process and at the same time what were the mistakes the Palestinians did in Oslo?
00:07:12
R: Many mistakes; we--we have done many mistakes as Palestinians. We have committed many mistakes as Palestinians and did we do these mistakes because we knew that they were a mistake and we wanted to commit them? No. The Israelis made many mistakes. Did they commit these mistakes because they wanted to do the mistakes? No. The Americans made so many mistakes. We as Palestinians made mistakes but we were not the exclusive owners of these mistakes. We’re the [cost-free]; we’re the party that people can blame because it’s my word against an Israeli in the Congress and the Senate. I don’t stand a chance as a Palestinian. But honest truth, we made mistakes as Palestinians. The Israelis made mistakes and Americans made mistakes and I think the lesson today and our ability to cross towards the vision of the two-State solution--did you learn from these mistakes? And that’s the real question that we have to address to ourselves.
00:08:16
I: Foreign Minister--former Foreign Minister Shlomo Ben-Ami has said the idea of trust-building which was the foundation of the Oslo process--he believes you must have peace before you can build trust. Do you think that the Oslo approach was correct or should there have been an attempt to reach final settlements or to the outlines of final settlements at the beginning?
00:08:40
R: I don’t--I don’t argue with Shlomo; he’s a good man and he’s a man who invested so much in this peace process. And I don’t want to go into a chicken and egg--what comes first--peace or confidence, security, or peace. I mean these things are inseparable. You just cannot separate between peace and confidence; you cannot separate between peace and security. What comes first? This is not about sequential approaches--rather than a parallel approach. Now we have come a long way thanks to Shlomo Ben-Ami, thanks to Dennis Ross, thanks to all these people who have exerted much effort in this endeavor and we should focus on the day tomorrow. That’s the focus; that should be the focus. I’m not--I’m not--I’m not engaging in this peace process for the sake of Israelis. And this is a development; maybe this is one of the things I learned from my mistakes. I’m doing this peace process for my own sake, for my children’s sake, and I hope that the Israelis will realize the same thing. The peace process between us and the Israelis is not about scoring points; it’s not about assigning blame; it’s not about who gains and who loses; it’s not about a zero-sum game. The uniqueness of this conflict it just--it has to have either two winners and two losers; two losers--we have been through blame assignment, business of killing each other, and so on; and winners we can only be through this peace process. Once the Israelis realize that they’re doing this peace process for their own sake, once I realize that I’m doing this peace process for my own sake as a Palestinian, once we understand that at the end of the day we need to marry the concerns, once as a Palestinian I want to feel it in my heart. I don’t need to believe what the Israelis say. They don’t need to convince me; all I need to--to educate myself to understand is to take their concerns and their fears seriously. And I want them to do the same to me. I’m not going to convert to Judaism and become an Israeli. They will not convert to Christianity or Islam and become Palestinians. Here is a question about accommodation. How can I accommodate without taking seriously your concerns and your aspirations and your fears? And maybe we began learning as Palestinians how to take these concerns seriously and I hope that they’re learning now to take my fears and concerns, my aspirations seriously. They don’t need to believe in it; I’m not asking them to believe in it; I’m asking them to take it seriously and I’m asking myself to take their concerns seriously.
Now how many times did you go to negotiations feeling that we--as Palestinians we are the underdog? And we are the underdog? We’re the victims and we are the victims. And it’s not fair and it’s not just and all these feelings--just absolutely right. But at the end of the day who said politics is about fairness and justice? And who is running a [inaudible] organization and at the end of the day I’m trying to endeavor because I want to save my children’s life. I don’t want my son to be a suicide bomber and I want him to live normal like any American boy. I want him to go to school not worrying whether he’s going to come back or not; I want him to be a teacher, a farmer, a painter, a soccer player, a football player, a musician, what--I want normality as a Palestinian. And I’m sure that the Israeli fathers want the same. I--I think they want their children to go on buses without fearing that they will explode. So that--the whole accommodation here--we’re--we’re trying to save lives of Israelis and Palestinians. And to those who would like to criticize the peace process and say Oslo is wrong, I think there is nothing wrong with Oslo; there is nothing wrong with the peace process. We are the eyes and hearts and minds of peace; it’s us and it’s our fears and it’s our hesitancy that prevented an agreement--not the agreements. The agreement said, negotiate Jerusalem border, settlements, refugees, and so on. Accommodate--irrespective of what happens you know negotiating in peace and frustration between Palestinians and Israel in five years is cheaper than exchanging bullets for five minutes. And I hope we learned this lesson.
00:13:09
I: Were the Arab States helpful in advancing the Oslo process towards resolution? Do you wish they played more active and constructive roles in the process?
00:13:18
R: I--yes; I--I do wish that they had played a more active role, but I think in 2002 the Arabs came out very strong with the [Arab initiative] of Saudi Arabia. Prince Abdullah’s--at the time--initiative--you know King Abdullah and I believe this was the most strategic advanced option or plan that Arabs had put forward. And I believe the Arabs now are much more ready than they were in Camp David.
00:13:40
I: How was it that Netanyahu approached the negotiation different from Rabin or Peres? Dennis Ross told us that Arafat once said that Netanyahu was putting him in a corner. What did Arafat mean by that?
00:13:56
R: Look, people negotiate in their respective--in the name of their respective people and their respective parties trying to protect their interests and so on. So it’s inappropriate for me to start comparing negotiators. We don’t stand guards in who negotiates on behalf of Israel. I don’t want to make peace with this person or that person in Israel or this party or that party. I want to make peace with all Israelis. But having said that I want to say we should distinguish between tough negotiators and non-negotiators.
00:14:40
I: Did Barak emphasize on the Syrian track--[negativity] Palestinian Israeli negotiation?
00:14:46
R: No; on the contrary. We--we never--as--that’s--that’s the point. We as Palestinians believe in a comprehensive peace agreement. We believe that peace and stability cannot be attained without a solution on the Syrian track, Lebanese track, Egyptian track, Jordanian track. On the contrary, we thought and we told the Americans and we told the Israelis that reaching an agreement with Syria--[with Israel withdrawing] to the Syrian borders with Syria will help us and the same thing with Shebaa Farm in Lebanon--at that time South Lebanon or whatever that was [inaudible]. We never as Palestinians allowed anybody to play track against track. We’re not scared of a Syrian track or a Lebanese track. At the end of the day we know that the cause of the problem is not Syria, is not Egypt, is not Jordan, is not Lebanon--the cause of the problem is the non-solution to the Palestinian problem.
00:15:38
I: Did Arafat feel forced into going to Camp David? Did he feel that Clinton and Barak were pushing him to go?
00:15:44
R: Yes; unfortunately yes. President Arafat wanted more preparation for Camp David. President Arafat said that we were not ready, that the Americans were not ready, that the Israelis were not ready and he said they needed preparations.
As a matter of fact, in the meeting that took place on June 25th with Secretary Albright in Romala, they agreed to have three weeks of vast preparation. And me and Dennis Ross agreed to put the venue--to agree on the venue and to go next week for three weeks secret somewhere, maybe in Washington--whatever, any of the stations there. And then all of the sudden three days later President Clinton phoned President Arafat and invited him to come the 11th of July to--to Camp David. Yes; President Arafat thought the Summit was not prepared; we needed more time and he could not say--he was put in a situation where he could not say no to an invitation coming from the United States President. And he said to President Clinton on the phone, we’re not ready; you’re not ready; the Israelis are not ready and I’m afraid that you will blame me. And President Clinton responded in that phone call which I was listening to--I promise you I will never assign blame on you.
00:17:05
I: As the weaker party was violence a tool that Arafat had to consider, in order to equalize the situation--pressure Israel to [make] concessions? Did the Israeli--Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon prove that violent resistance works?
00:17:19
R: No, no, no; President Arafat was
very--very aware of the differences between us and Lebanon, Egypt and
Palestine, Jordan--there is many differences, okay. And President
Arafat did not--did not pursue violence. President Arafat went to
Barak’s home and [inaudible] and asked him and begged him not to allow
Sharon to go to Al-Haram al-Sharif. And he said to him this will break
something I cannot control and you will not control. He sent me to
Washington; and I spoke to Dennis Ross in Washington; please prevent
him--use everything to prevent Sharon from going to Al-Haram al-Sharif.
Look; I’m no match as a Palestinian. I’m no match; you can blame
me, you can tell me things, you can assign blame, you can go to
Congress, go to the Senate, go to the media in the United States and
then echo a certain idea and then people will ask me how come you
didn’t tell the story of--of Camp David--because I believe the whole
thing that was said about Arafat and about us is absolutely unfair and
untrue. And I said the time will come. Today I’m no match. My word
against theirs; I don’t stand a chance.
00:18:46
I: Did--did Arafat say at Camp David he would--he would be assassinated if he accepted the American peace proposal? Tell us the story.
00:18:53
R: President Arafat said many things and the assassination--he mentioned the word I’ll be assassinated, but not that he was worried personally about himself. President Arafat was asked to recognize that there is something called--[under me], the Al-Haram al-Sharif--that the President Arafat was asked to recognize that there is a [Temple Mount] underneath Al-Haram al-Sharif and President Arafat said that [they excavated] for 30 years or more and did not find anything. And I can't do that. I’m not denying--I’m not telling Israel what to believe or not to believe; I’m not telling Jews what to believe and what--. I respect what they believe but they don’t need to ask me to become a Jew to be acceptable to them. My belief is my belief and their belief is their belief. And he said I cannot do that. I’m responsible for Christians and for the Muslims. And anyone who crosses these lines will be assassinated.
00:20:08
I: Tell us about the last night at Camp David when you, Ben-Ami, and the Americans discussed a final deal. What did you come up with and why was it rejected?
00:20:19
R: We--I sat with President Clinton and Mr. Ben-Ami for about six hours and we agreed to come out with a statement saying that much progress was made at Camp David and that we were intent to continue these negotiations once we get back home. And this was published. I was asked to give Camp David a positive spin and to say the truth about what happened because I believe that we broke 80-percent [of the taboos] in Camp David. As a matter of fact, I was asked by Ted Koppel on Nightline’s program and I said we broke 80-percent of the [taboos]. We came a long way; it wasn’t a failure. And then all of a sudden I hear that they offered us the biggest offer in Camp David and we said no to it. The offer of President Clinton was made to us on December 23rd, 2000--not in Camp David.
00:21:18
I: And then Dennis Ross believes that--that the Camp David Accords fell because of Yassar Arafat. Do you agree? Give us your [opinion] of Arafat’s strengths and weaknesses.
00:21:27
R: First of all, I don’t--I don’t agree that Camp David failed. We may not have produced an agreement but we have come a long way in Camp David and I disagree totally that President Arafat was responsible for the failure of Camp David. President Arafat told Mr. Ross and Dr. Albright and President Clinton that we need more preparations--we need more preparations. We’re not ready; you’re not ready and don’t expect white smoke. And as a matter of fact, those of us who said this they were accused later on in the memoirs and biographies and so on that this was the evidence that we were not ready for the--the end-game. I think Camp David was not a failure; I think that Camp David will prove historically speaking that it--the stones that Palestinians--. You know for the first time in my life I was able to discuss issues of Jerusalem that I have never talked about before was in Camp David--refugees, borders, swaps; you cannot call Camp David a failure. Yes; we did not produce and agreement in Camp David, but this will constitute a cornerstone.
00:22:50
I: About Arafat’s strengths and weaknesses?
00:22:54
R: Well look, Arafat is a man who died; he’s not with us. His legacy to me and the legacy to the Palestinian people--he’s a man who initiated the peace of the brave; he’s the first Palestinian leader with the courage to organize the State of Israel’s right to exist and live in a secured border in 1967. He did his best against many, many, many odds. President Arafat had no army, no navy, no air force, no country, no economy; people can blame him, people can slug him, but to me his legacy--he is the one who initiated the peace of the brave. And he will remember and he must be remembered amongst Palestinians from all people--he’s the one who took us in this journey of peace and now it’s our responsibility to finish this journey by realizing the two-State solution for Israelis and Palestinians. President Arafat should be remembered for being the first Palestinian to ever say we want peace for our children and their children--referring to the Israelis. And that’s the legacy of President Arafat that should be remembered.
00:24:12
I: One more question; why did the Oslo peace process and Camp David negotiation fail--was trying and failing worse than not trying at all?
00:24:21
R: I don’t think they failed; that’s the thing. I mean what--how do you--how do you judge failure--by not producing an agreement? Look, [Laughs] I want those in conflict resolution; I want those who deal with crisis management; I want those who deal with mediation; I want those who deal with damage control; I want those who deal with negotiations to understand--Palestinians and Israelis are negotiating the issues that make them breathe. The Israelis and Palestinians are negotiating issues that make them breathe, that make them live, that make them believe that they--make them faithful to their religions, that make them aspire, that make them heal, that make them feel scared, feel hopeful; they are negotiating with the issues that make them cry and laugh; they’re negotiating their issues about their being--about their existence. It’s not your normal negotiations. Now I want to finish by saying a sentence. I don’t care if someone is pro-Israel or someone is pro-Palestinian; my constituency is divided between those who are pro-peace and those who are against peace.
00:26:04
[End Saeb Erekat Interview]